

property and land. Didn't always work out as a v. democratic affair - the forms were followed but quite often most of the resolutions passed originated in suggns. made by Dutch officials. The reformers didn't stop at the village level - councils were set up at higher levels - over the village councils ~~was~~ ^{was} the Provincial Council, over the Provincial Councils was the Regency Council. At the apex was the national body known as the Volksraad or People's Council, wh. was est. in 1918. (The introd. of this more broadly-based system of govt. and admin ~~of this more broadly-based system of govt. and admin~~ still further weakened the ~~Java~~ influence of the Jav. Regents because the members of the Regency Councils were as often as not better educated and more adept at quasi-democ. procedure than the Regent was. - although they couldnt. themselves become Regents (still the highest position in the native admin. hierarchy) because the hereditary principle was still ~~current~~ ^{current}.) At the same time, under the govt.'s new program for native welfare, there was an enormous growth in the special branches of the govt. service wh. were concerned w. such things as irrigation, rural credit banks, clinics, agricultural extension programs, village schools etc. (The people in charge of providing these things often by-passed the Regent in their eagerness to get things done (Dutch had terrific reputation for paternalistic efficiency in their colony).) (On the cultural side, many of the Eth. Pol. reformers, notably Snouck Hurgronje, ~~were~~ thought that neither Islam nor the adat (trad. ^{law and custom} ~~customary law~~) wld. do as a guide for the Indons. in the mod. world. They thought that the old santri and prijaji civs. wld. have to be superseded by Dutch civ.) To achieve this, w'n education was obviously necessary. But Snouck H. said that education was only the first step - wld. inevitably have to be followed / educated / pol. and admin. by giving Indonesians a steadily greater share in the management of the colony. In fact he warned that time was running out fast. Benda says of him (Crescent and the Rising Sun, p. 28/9) : " Few foresaw as clearly as he did the ultimate demise of colonialism; fewer still were prepared to draw the logical and inevitable consequences from this insight. In pressing for the higher education of the Indon. elite, for their assoc. w. Dutch culture and for the rapid Indonesianization of colonial admin., Snouck stood virtually alone ". S.H's specifically Islamic recommendations were implemented ^{much} more than his other ideas. The Dutch did make some progress in education but not all that much - literacy rate at the beg. of the 2nd W.W. was only 6%. (see J. Legge, Indonesia, p. 105 for figures on the no. of Indonesians at school in 1940).

What were the results of the Eth. Pol. in terms of native welfare? One of the weaknesses of the movt. from the v. beg. was that reformers such as Snouck H., though genuinely benevolent and altruistic themselves, rather naively believed that ec. interests wld. willingly make sacrifices for considerations of native welfare. From the beg. reformist enthusiasm was held in check by the demands of W'n private enterprise - notably in the matter of setting up native industry (wh. wld. of course have meant setting up competition). Legge says that the ec. measures taken in the period of the Eth. Pol. were mostly in the nature of palliatives to relieve particular areas of hardship (e.g. the estment of rural credit banks) but not attempting any thorough-going change. (These palliative measures were more than offset by the continuing effects of the introd. of Dutch capital and of the "plantation economy" which began under the Liberal period. Among the effects of the introd. of Dutch ec. interests were the growth of banks, communications etc. and also the growth of large cities (e.g. Batavia, Surabaja, Medan).) The pop. increase led to an influx of people into the cities and the growth of slums. The plantation labour system led to a breakdown in village society. Dr. Boeke concluded from the Reports of Ec. Enquiries made in 1924 and 1926 that the peasant ate rather less well than before the First W.W., despite all the benevolent activity on his behalf.

(Van Deventer (the author of "A Debt of Honour" and one of the most influential Eth. Pol. advocates) had exclaimed "But how glorious is the aim we pursue! It is: the formation out there in the Far East of a soc. entity wh. is indebted to the Netherlands for its prosperity and higher culture and thankfully recognizes this fact". However as we have seen prosperity had not really accompanied the spreading of Dutch civ. and the natives as it turned out did not feel terribly grateful. This was especially the case among the ^{new} educated classes whose members soon discovered that they cld. not get jobs commensurate w. their qualifications, since the Dutch did not take the complementary measure of opening up the middle and higher ranks of the admin. to the Indons. They also found that there was a certain gap btwn. the ideas of democracy etc. they learned in their w'n education on the one hand and colonial practice on the other.

(The first Indon. response to the Eth. Pol. spirit was Budi Utomo (1908) - based on a fusion of Dutch and Jav. ideas, seemed

to shew that the reformers had had a good effect and everything in the garden wld. be lovely. But it was followed fairly soon by pol. organizations wh. actually demanded complete independence! ((See next lecture on Indon. nationalism). The ~~is~~ communist revolts of 1926-7 in W. Java and Sumatra were the death blow of the Eth. Pol. - the conservative element in the colonial admin., always fairly strong, was now able to claim that the reformers had done tremendous harm in disrupting the trad. Indon soc. by trying to w'nize it too fast. Benda h'ever says that the Eth. Pol. was not the real cause, wh. was the disrupting effects of the intrusion of w'n soc. from the time of the Liberal period. Says that the accusation of the conservatives of " too much, too soon " was less justified than to say " too little, too late ".

The Eth. Pol. was never officially abandoned. But though the institutions set up remained in existence, they underwent a subtle change. Fro instance, the Dutch govt. took care ^{to see} that the Indon. majority of the Volkeraad (came over-
was pro-Dutch.)
whelmingly from the prijaji class and was therefore rather pro-Dutch. Benda says that " the ensuing confusion btwn. form and substance was paralleled by a widening gap btwn. promise and fulfillment wh both of wh. were to last until the end of Dutch rule ". (p. 36) (Note: has this led to a certain cynicism vis-a-vis democ. procedure in the mod. Indon. elite?)

The Dutch returned to their old policy of supporting the Regents and prijaji on Java and the adat chiefs elsewhere. In earlier times they had supported these groups against the muslim leaders, because Islam was a unifying and anti-Dutch force ~~maxi~~ in Indonesia. Now they supported these groups against Islam and also against other unifying anti-Dutch forces such as secular nationalism and Marxism. This was the ^{great} period of the Leiden adat law school, under C. van Vollenhoven, who made a v. scholarly study of the adat. His respect for the native Indon. law and custom = good but it was used by conservatives for their own ends - wanted to maintain the adat, and since this = differnt from place to place, it was obviously necessary to have the Dutch in control of the central govt. of the mod. state (The Eth. Pol. people had wanted a modern, w'n law system for everybody in Indonesia, no matter what their region or race). The romanticism and the divisive effect of the adat law school has been bitterly attacked by S.T. S Alisjahbana in his book " Indonesia in the Modern World ".