

First Term, 1974: Dutch and Indonesians in the 18th century.

pp 1-7

Changes in the nature of the VOC " empire " .

Refer back to Coen's idea of a far-flung web catching the whole trade of Asia in its mesh. 17th century: widely-dispersed Dutch factories, ^{and forts} often established and maintained by military campaigns which took VOC armies to many different parts of SEA. But Coen's vision proved in the long run not viable: There seem to have been several reasons for this: 1). as we have seen before, to cut out rival sea traders, whether European or Asian, it proved necessary to eradicate their land and harbour refuges, and thus to conquer one sultanate or principality after another. These wars were costly, and there was a limit to the amount of territory the VOC could reasonably expect to hold; 2). many of the ~~the~~ VOC posts turned out to operate at a loss (e.g. Japan). It seems ~~is~~ that one factor here was the Company's monopoly policy, which ~~was~~ drastically reduced the profits which could be made by the Asian inhabs. of its territory, and hence their buying power - so they could not afford the European and west or east Asian goods which the VOC wished to sell in its efforts to est. a 2-way trade. 3). malpractices among the Company's own servants - e.g. private trading (forbidden), ~~take~~ siphoning off a percentage of the Company's goods etc. The occurrence of this sort of thing might be expected in a sit. where salaries were very low, there were no pensions - and, as de Graaf says, ~~the~~ men did not go out to the east in the expectation of being just as poor when they returned. ^{*} / In 1696, tthe VOC still showed a profit (F 40m) but ~~by~~ ⁱⁿ 1725 the period of losses began - reached 87m. in 1779. To hide this situation from the Dutch public - VOC was one of the chief pillars of the Netherland's prosperity - the regular dividend continued to be paid (it averaged 16.5% between 1737 and 1782 → de Graaf p. 166), and the gap was made up from loans.

check

* In 1722, 26 of the Company's officials were actually beheaded for private trading

~~This situation xxxxxxxxxx~~ This lack of success in its internat. trade made the VOC turn to a different sort of operation, one centred mainly on Java, where its principal base was situated. They began to depend increasingly on extracting export produce from Java. The products involved were teak, - Java at this period still had extensive teak forests - and a number of crops which were actually introduced into Java by the VOC. Of these the most important was coffee, planted principally in the hilly regions of west Java (the Preanger). The coffee was produced via the agency of the native regents (Bupati): ^{acc. to a system of " forced deliveries "} in their Act of Appointment, they guaranteed to deliver a certain amount at a certain price. This price was at first arrived at by agreement between the 2 parties, but as time went on the VOC was in the stronger position and could fix it unilaterally. The Regent was allowed to raise his own " taxes " (In kind) and was expected to " pay " his own subordinates. In districts outside the coffee and teak areas, a different system, that of " contingencies " operated: here the Regent signed a deed of alliance in wh. he agreed to deliver a part of the produce of his regency to the VOC as a form of tribute, without payment. (In fact the distinction between the 2 systems was blurred as contingencies were sometimes paid for and forced deliveries not.^{1.}). The humble beginnings of the ^{later} Dutch colonial admin. were laid at this period with the appointment of " overseers " (opzieners - also known as coffee-sergeants from their function in organising the most important crop) who were supposed to see that the cultivators were complying with their instructions to plant a certain amount of a certain crop (reasons why they might not: interference with rice cultivation, and consid. dilution of profitability by the time it reached the base level). Also supposed to keep an eye on the Regent. In practice many coffee-sergeants made quite a bit of money for themselves by advancing money to the Regent, at interest, to allow him to carry through the cultivation of the crop (not paid until delivered). See Furnivall, Neth. India p. 37 and p. 193.

1. See Palmier, Soc. Status, p. 29, " Jav. Nobility " p. 206, and van Welderen Rengers, Failure of a Liberal Colonial Policy p. 10.

VOC's 18thc. military ventures.

Also concentrated on Java. Banten now a dependent state. First half of 17th century a period of intensive VOC involvement with Mataram, beginning with the " Jav. wars of succession ":

1704: First Jav. War of Succession: Mangkurat III (Sunan Mas) dethroned by the Dutch in favour of Pangeran Puger (later Pakubuwana I), who had asked for their assistance.*

1706,7: expeds. v. Surapati, who had allied w. Mangkurat III.

1719: Second Jav. War of Succession. When P.B.I died, the succession of his son Mangkurat IV was contested by his other sons. Mangk. IV was established on the throne w. Dutch help.

The period from 1740 to 1757 was one of almost continual warfare on Java. It ~~spanned~~ began among the Chinese community in Batavia - a very large community ~~whose~~ whose presence there owed much to direct Dutch encouragement: Coen for instance had considered the Chinese more diligent than the natives, and regarded their presence as essential to Batavia's commercial success. They were active in many fields - tradesmen, artisans, small traders, restaurateurs, arak distillers, and were foremost in commercial agriculture - esp. sugar (also important in the estment. of commercial sugar planting in Siam in the 19th century). Later Dutch administrators however, were alarmed

* 5 Oct. 1705: Herman de Wilde made a new agreement with the Sunan, whereby the whole Preanger and the state of Cirebon passed from Mataram to the VOC; also the eastern half of Madura. State debt cancelled, but Sunan obliged to deliver 800 koyans of rice p.a. for a quarter century. Garrison of 200 in Kartasura.

by the threat which seemed to be posed by unemployed Chinese who formed itinerant gangs, and regulations were introduced which provided for the deportation of Chinese not usefully employed to the Dutch plantations in Ceylon and at the C. of Good Hope. There were abuses in the carrying out of these regulations: some Dutch officials extorted money from wealthy Chinese under the threat of deportation; and rumours spread that the Dutch were actually shipping the Chinese and throwing them overboard at sea. As a result, large numbers of Chinese fled from Batavia and began to organise armed resistance, and when this became known, the non-Chinese population of Batavia went berserk - fell upon the remaining Chinese in a series of massacres. The G-G (XIX Valckenier) actually ordered the immediate execution of all Chinese prisoners. Outside Batavia, the Chinese resistance spread along the entire north coast, and inland ~~is~~ when the ruler of Mataram (P.B. II - had come to the throne in 1727) ~~sz~~ decided to join forces with the Chinese: killed the Dutch garrison. However, he later had second thoughts about the wisdom of this and made peace with the Dutch. But ~~events~~ Jav. involvement had a logic of its own which was sustained without him, and in fact he was dethroned by the anti-Dutch party (replaced by a grandson of Mangkurat III).

In the event the Dutch got on top of the sit. - aided by Cakraningrat IV, prince of Madura, who hoped to profit from this alliance (ambitious: wanted a domain on the Jav. mainland). P.B. II was restored to his throne: in return, had to cede to the VOC the whole n. coast of Java and to renounce (for 1746 contract see de Graaf p. 260) all claims to suzerainty over Madura. After regaining his throne, he shifted the capital to Surakarta (Solo). Finally, Cakraningrat, whom the VOC had not rewarded as he had expected, led a fierce campaign v. the Dutch (see De Graaf pp. 260-261) which ended in his being exiled to the Cape.

No lasting peace was estd., however. P.B. II's brother, Mangkubumi, rose in rebellion, joined by his nephew Mas Said. ~~They~~ They gained a considerable amount of support and the war took on the aspect of a war of liberation v. Dutch control. During the war P.B. II died, and on his deathbed

ceded (" nitipaken ") his kingdom to the Dutch. The Dutch had to fight a long and destructive war to put P.B. II's son (P.B. III) on the throne, and their position was made the more difficult in that there was a serious revolt in Banten in 1650/1 which ~~necessitated~~ necessitated the involvement of VOC troops. (see de Graaf pp. 269-71).

Fighting went on until 1755. During this time there was a rather complicated and shifting pattern of alliances, and the Dutch were ~~xxxx~~ able to a certain extent to isolate / separate the rebel leaders (check). In 1755 the Dutch had established control of the sit. such that they were able to partition Mataram (treaty of Gianti 13 Feb 1755). It was divided into 2 main principalities, one w. its capital still at Surakarta, under P.B. III, and one w. its capital at Jogjakarta, ruled by Mangkubumi (title now Sultan Mangkubuwana - Hamengkubuwana). Both states acknowledged VOC suzerainty. In addition , in 1757 a 3rd small principality (of 4,000 cacahs - dependent on Surakarta) was created for Mas Said. Called the " Mangkunegaran " principality after the title of its rulers. The territory of ea. principality was not in a single block, but fragmented / into small tracts and ~~scattered~~ scattered among tracts of land belonging to the other principalities, an arrangement made by the Dutch to prevent dangerous concentrations of power. These 3 princely houses (and a 4th, the Pakualaman, created as a fief of Yogya by Raffles) are still in existence.

The last major Dutch campaign on Java was the conquest of the so-called " Oosthoek ", which took place between 1767 and 1777. The pol. apparatus here centred on Balambangan, the last H. kdom on Java, belonging to the ^Balinese cultural sphere rather than the Jav. Area became a refuge for anti-Dutch elements: sons of Surapati, Chinese who had fled there after the 1740 troubles, Buginese, Makassarese, Madurese (check last three). One curious cultural result of the Dutch conquest was that the Dutch actually enforced a change in the state religion from Hinduism to Islam, to break Balambangan's ties w. Bali.

So by 1777 the ~~Dutch~~ VOC had in fact extinguished or subjugated all rivals on Java. But it did not survive long to extract ~~the~~ profit from its expanded domain, being dissolved on 31 Dec. 1799, thus providing a neat periodization for Dutch colonial history. What was the reason for its being wound up? Van Leur: ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ ^{developments} in Europ. politics. These devts. were

1). American War of Independence - Dutch took American side, and therefore ~~xxxxxxxx~~ sustained English attacks in SEA: English managed to conquer the VOC's possessions in India and most of Sumatra. Of gt. importance was the superiority, by this period of time, of English shipping: could prevent the VOC getting products from Indonesia to their European markets. 1784: Treaty of Paris compelled the Dutch to give the English the right to trade in their territories, breaking the VOC monopoly.

2). French REV. Repercussions in Holland: 1795 a republican govt. (the Batavian Repub.) was set up. Sheltered by the French Revolutionary armies, and the Dutch ruler, Wm. V, fled to England. From London issued instructions to VOC governors not to obstruct the entry of British forces as part of the anti-French strategy. British promised to give back the Dutch possessions after the war succesfully completed and Wm. restored. So British took the Cape of G.H., Ceylon, all the Dutch posts in India and on the west coast of Sumatra, and also Malacca. Did not attempt to take Java - interesting to know what wld. have happened if they had, since the Dutch G-G at Batavia and other officials were apparently prepared to disregard Wm's instructions and resist.

The Batavian Recub. apparently regarded the VOC as ~~an~~ a pillar of the ancien régime, and ~~xxxx~~ decided to take over its territorial possessions ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ on 31 Dec. 1799. Also took over its debts: 134m guilders. Seems an enormous sum compared w. its initial capital of 6.5m. (cf. de Graaf, p. 354: encumbrances of ~~126~~ 126m, profits/ assets of 10m). (van Leur does not comment on ^{figures of} balance-sheet as at winding-up)

18th. cent. in retrospect is seen as a century of almost continual warfare for the VOC: 1st 3/4 with Javanese powers and remainder with European enemies. However, a societies capacities seldom seem to be entirely taken up by warfare, and the Dutch on Java did have other preoccupations. What were they like? One mistake one must avoid is to identify with the Dutch: to assume that because they were Europeans, they must somehow be like us, as opposed to Asians, whom we know to be different. Europeans of this period were also v. diff. from us, and in some ways had more in common with Asians of the same period. It is very hard for us to sympathize with Coen, for instance, when he has a 13-year-old girl put to death because she had allowed herself to be seduced by her fiancé (see Boxer, Dutch Sea-Borne Emp. p. ²³²) or to regard with anything but revulsion the fates that those convicted of homosexuality or witchcraft met (torn with red-hot pincers and so on). Dutch not particularly bad, just typical. Dutch are sometimes portrayed, in contrast to the Portuguese, as primarily hard-headed businessmen, not much interested in religion. But they were also children of the age, and it was an age which though instinctively in religious categories - see e.g. Batavia prohibitions against the sale of firearms to natives who are not Christians.

to follow: Batavia (lecture VII, 1971 pp. 3-4 and lecture on Batavia)
 - impact of Dutch on Indon. civ. (lecture VII, 1971 pp. 6-8,
 and material on 18th cent. Jav. civ. - Yasadipura I and II
 of Surakarta; Ranggawarsita, 1803 - 1873).

See Pigeaud. Lit. of Java vol. I